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Question :

Directions : Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions that follow.

Social capital has long been recognized as a critical determinant of political and economic development. Defined broadly as the networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation among individuals and institutions, social capital influences the success of democratic governance. The contrast between successful and unsuccessful democracies often lies not only in institutional design but also in the density and quality of civic life. The case of Italy, particularly the stark divide between its northern and southern regions, offers a compelling illustration of how variations in social capital can produce divergent democratic and developmental outcomes. In the early 1990s, political scientists such as Robert Putnam emphasized the role of social capital in determining institutional performance across different regions of Italy. His comparative study of Italy's regional governments over two decades found that northern Italy - home to robust civic traditions, mutual aid societies, and horizontal forms of association - developed highly responsive and effective institutions. These regions consistently demonstrated strong economic indicators, higher levels of citizen participation, and government accountability.

By contrast, southern Italy was characterized by vertical networks, patron-client relationships, and a deficit in civic engagement. This social fabric, lacking the dense associational life of the north, contributed to administrative inefficiency and poor policy outcomes. Governments in the south were often inefficient, opaque, and plagued by corruption. Public services were erratic, and economic development remained persistently underwhelming. The sluggish pace of reform and delivery in these areas undermined public trust and fed into a self-perpetuating cycle of institutional underperformance. This regional divide reveals much about the conditions under which democracies either flourish or falter. In successful democracies, social capital acts as a lubricant that enables institutions to function effectively. High levels of trust reduce transaction costs, encourage cooperation, and make policy implementation smoother. In unsuccessful or struggling democracies, the absence of social capital leads to fragmentation, opportunism, and inefficiencies that stall development. Italy's internal divide thus serves as a microcosm of global democratic variation.

The implications of this divide are not only political but also socio-economic. Northern Italy has long been a hub of industrial innovation and economic dynamism. Its firms, embedded in a network of civic associations and supported by efficient public infrastructure, have contributed to the region's global competitiveness. In contrast, the South's economic growth can be traced to both infrastructural neglect and a lack of civic trust. Developmental aid and top-down reforms have often failed in the absence of a vibrant civil society that can hold institutions accountable. This dichotomy also sheds light on the broader discourse surrounding democratization. While formal institutions like constitutions, electoral systems, and courts are vital, they cannot operate effectively in a vacuum. Without the informal institutions provided by social capital, democratic structures remain brittle. Italy's experience supports the theory that democracy is as much about culture and social organization as it is about rules and procedures.

Furthermore, the Italian case underscores the long-term historical roots of social capital. The northern regions benefited from a medieval legacy of city-states, trade guilds, and communal governance. These traditions fostered habits of collaboration and civic responsibility. The south, conversely, inherited a history of feudalism and centralized rule, which stifled the development of autonomous civil institutions. These historical trajectories have left a durable imprint on modern political behavior and institutional performance. In light of these patterns, policy efforts aimed at improving governance and development in underperforming democracies must go beyond technocratic fixes. Strengthening social capital - by investing in education, supporting grassroots organizations, and encouraging participatory governance - can help overcome institutional stagnation. In Italy, various civic renewal initiatives and EU-funded programs have sought to revitalize local governance in the south, with mixed success. While some communities have shown resilience and innovation, others remain mired in inertia, suggesting that building social capital is a gradual, generational process. The Italian case vividly illustrates how social capital can shape the fate of democracies. It explains why similar institutional frameworks yield dramatically different outcomes and why some regions prosper while others experience minimal progress. As democratic institutions face renewed scrutiny worldwide, the lessons from Italy remain timely: Robust civil society and trust-based networks are not optional - they are the lifeblood of sustainable democracy.

Which of the following statements best aligns with the nuanced perspective offered in the passage regarding the effectiveness and limitations of governance reforms in Southern Italy?

I. Institutional enhancements in Southern Italy witnessed swift success when backed by external aid, showcasing the efficacy of technocratic interventions.

II. The passage underscores the foundational role of grassroots civic engagement and educational investment in fostering durable democratic reform.

III. Attempts to stimulate local governance have encountered uneven progress, attributed in part to entrenched socio-historical legacies inhibiting civic renewal.

1. Only I

2. Both I and II

3. Both I and III

4. Both II and III

5. All I, II, and III

Correct Answer : 4
Solution :

Statement I is incorrect: The passage rejects the notion that technocratic, top-down solutions alone brought swift success. In fact, it highlights their frequent failure in the absence of strong civil society structures.

Statement II is correct: The passage emphasizes the importance of bottom-up approaches, such as education, participatory governance, and support for local organizations, in building long-term institutional strength.

Statement III is correct: It clearly indicates that revitalization efforts have been inconsistent and ties this to deep-seated historical patterns that have inhibited the development of trust-based civic institutions in the South.

Therefore, option (d) is correct.

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