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Question :

Directions : Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions that follow.

Social capital has long been recognized as a critical determinant of political and economic development. Defined broadly as the networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation among individuals and institutions, social capital influences the success of democratic governance. The contrast between successful and unsuccessful democracies often lies not only in institutional design but also in the density and quality of civic life. The case of Italy, particularly the stark divide between its northern and southern regions, offers a compelling illustration of how variations in social capital can produce divergent democratic and developmental outcomes. In the early 1990s, political scientists such as Robert Putnam emphasized the role of social capital in determining institutional performance across different regions of Italy. His comparative study of Italy's regional governments over two decades found that northern Italy - home to robust civic traditions, mutual aid societies, and horizontal forms of association - developed highly responsive and effective institutions. These regions consistently demonstrated strong economic indicators, higher levels of citizen participation, and government accountability.

By contrast, southern Italy was characterized by vertical networks, patron-client relationships, and a deficit in civic engagement. This social fabric, lacking the dense associational life of the north, contributed to administrative inefficiency and poor policy outcomes. Governments in the south were often inefficient, opaque, and plagued by corruption. Public services were erratic, and economic development remained persistently underwhelming. The sluggish pace of reform and delivery in these areas undermined public trust and fed into a self-perpetuating cycle of institutional underperformance. This regional divide reveals much about the conditions under which democracies either flourish or falter. In successful democracies, social capital acts as a lubricant that enables institutions to function effectively. High levels of trust reduce transaction costs, encourage cooperation, and make policy implementation smoother. In unsuccessful or struggling democracies, the absence of social capital leads to fragmentation, opportunism, and inefficiencies that stall development. Italy's internal divide thus serves as a microcosm of global democratic variation.

The implications of this divide are not only political but also socio-economic. Northern Italy has long been a hub of industrial innovation and economic dynamism. Its firms, embedded in a network of civic associations and supported by efficient public infrastructure, have contributed to the region's global competitiveness. In contrast, the South's economic growth can be traced to both infrastructural neglect and a lack of civic trust. Developmental aid and top-down reforms have often failed in the absence of a vibrant civil society that can hold institutions accountable. This dichotomy also sheds light on the broader discourse surrounding democratization. While formal institutions like constitutions, electoral systems, and courts are vital, they cannot operate effectively in a vacuum. Without the informal institutions provided by social capital, democratic structures remain brittle. Italy's experience supports the theory that democracy is as much about culture and social organization as it is about rules and procedures.

Furthermore, the Italian case underscores the long-term historical roots of social capital. The northern regions benefited from a medieval legacy of city-states, trade guilds, and communal governance. These traditions fostered habits of collaboration and civic responsibility. The south, conversely, inherited a history of feudalism and centralized rule, which stifled the development of autonomous civil institutions. These historical trajectories have left a durable imprint on modern political behavior and institutional performance. In light of these patterns, policy efforts aimed at improving governance and development in underperforming democracies must go beyond technocratic fixes. Strengthening social capital - by investing in education, supporting grassroots organizations, and encouraging participatory governance - can help overcome institutional stagnation. In Italy, various civic renewal initiatives and EU-funded programs have sought to revitalize local governance in the south, with mixed success. While some communities have shown resilience and innovation, others remain mired in inertia, suggesting that building social capital is a gradual, generational process. The Italian case vividly illustrates how social capital can shape the fate of democracies. It explains why similar institutional frameworks yield dramatically different outcomes and why some regions prosper while others experience minimal progress. As democratic institutions face renewed scrutiny worldwide, the lessons from Italy remain timely: Robust civil society and trust-based networks are not optional - they are the lifeblood of sustainable democracy.

What can be most reasonably inferred from the author's statement, "In light of these patterns, policy efforts aimed at improving governance and development in underperforming democracies must go beyond technocratic fixes"?

1. Technocratic reforms are irrelevant and should be abandoned in favor of grassroots activism.

2. The author believes underperforming democracies have already resolved most of their structural problems.

3. There is an implicit limitation in relying solely on expert-driven, top-down solutions for democratic reform.

4. Technocratic interventions have universally succeeded in transforming civic behavior across democracies.

5. Policy failures in democracies are primarily due to the incompetence of technocrats, not structural conditions.

Correct Answer : 3
Solution :

Option (c) is correct because the phrase "must go beyond technocratic fixes" implies that while technocratic solutions may play a role, they are insufficient on their own. The author suggests that relying exclusively on such methods overlooks deeper structural or civic dimensions of democratic dysfunction.

The other options are incorrect:

(a) is too extreme - the author doesn't say technocratic reforms are irrelevant, only that they are not enough.

(b) is false - the passage clearly addresses ongoing governance and development issues, implying that problems remain.

(d) contradicts the implied criticism of technocratic overreliance.

(e) is an overstatement - the critique is about the limitations of the approach, not personal failings of technocrats.

Thus, option (c) is the correct answer.

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